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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Purpose of This Article 
By promoting careful and loyal management, the fiduciary pro-
visions in the limited liability company (LLC) agreement of a New 
Hampshire LLC can make an important contribution to the LLC’s 
success.1  This article will: 
• Identify the principal fiduciary issues that are normally 
relevant in planning and negotiating these agreements; 
• Summarize the relevant statutory and common-law rules 
governing these issues; 
  
 1. Section 1, VII of the New Hampshire Limited Liability Company Act (New 
Hampshire LLC Act) defines a limited liability company agreement as “a written 
agreement of the members or a document adopted by the sole member as to the 
affairs of the limited liability company and the conduct of its business.”  N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1(VII) (2005).  This article will focus on LLC agree-
ments for multi-member LLCs.  These agreements are, in effect, partnership 
agreements among the members of these LLCs.  The agreement’s principal func-
tions is to define the legal and tax structure of the LLC and the rights and duties 
inter se among the LLC, its members and its managers.  See generally JOHN M. 
CUNNINGHAM & VERNON R. PROCTOR, DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS: 
FORMS AND PRACTICE MANUAL chs. 8, 9, 10, 11 (Ch. 14A forthcoming May 2010) 
(2009) [hereinafter DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS] (explaining the 
structure and function of LLC agreements). 
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• State whether these rules are mandatory, default, or per-
missive rules; and 
• Suggest how to address each issue in representing pro-
spective members and managers in negotiating New Hamp-
shire LLC deals.2 
The starting point in discussing how to negotiate the above fidu-
ciary issues will be the fiduciary provisions of the template form, 
designated Form 6.2, in Drafting Limited Liability Company Operat-
ing Agreements,3 a general (i.e., not state-specific) book on how to 
plan, negotiate, and draft LLC operating agreements.  The provisions 
in Form 6.2 seek to strike a balance between the interest of LLC 
members in preventing manager misconduct and the interest of LLC 
managers (and of the LLC founders and promoters who appoint 
them) in protecting managers from undue exposure to removal and 
to personal liability for the conduct of unavoidably risky business 
enterprises.  These Form 6.2 provisions will thus provide a useful 
basis for addressing these often conflicting interests. 
B.  The Origin and Scope of LLC Fiduciary Law 
Absent an agreement among the parties to the contrary, business-
entity fiduciary duties arise automatically under state common law 
and applicable statutory law whenever one person entrusts the man-
agement of his or her business to another person and the other person 
agrees to accept this entrustment.4  The two principal fiduciary du-
  
 2. The New Hampshire LLC Act provides for two basic management struc-
tures—a “member management” structure, under which each member of the LLC 
is also a manager and has LLC agency authority; and a “manager management” 
structure, under which only those persons (whether members or non-members) 
who are specifically appointed as managers in the LLC agreement are managers.  
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:26(I)–(II).  In this article, the term “manager” will 
refer both to members of member-managed, multi-member LLCs and to managers 
of manager-managed, multi-member LLCs. 
 3. JOHN CUNNINGHAM, DRAFTING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING 
AGREEMENTS, at F6.2-1 (1998) [hereinafter Form 6.2]. 
 4. Bond Purchase, L.L.C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 864 
(Del. Ch. 1999); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manu-
script at 2) (describing entrustment theory as the basis for LLC fiduciary law).  
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ties are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.5  The duty of care 
requires that business managers carry out their management respon-
sibilities non-negligently.6  The duty of loyalty requires that business 
managers avoid conflicts of interest with the entity that they have 
agreed to manage.7 
However, the common law of Delaware implies that managers 
are subject not only to a general duty of loyalty but also to seven 
separate subsidiary fiduciary duties implicit in that duty.8  As dis-
cussed below, these subsidiary duties probably apply also under the 
New Hampshire LLC Act. 
Moreover, statutory and common law in New Hampshire, Dela-
ware, and other states provide rules governing issues that are not 
themselves fiduciary, but are highly relevant to the interpretation and 
enforcement of the core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.9  These 
  
The term “fiduciary” is derived from the Latin word “fiducia,” meaning “trust.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 465 (11th ed. 2006). 
 5. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 2). 
 6. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc, v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 192 (Del. Ch. 
2005); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14). 
 7. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20).  
See generally Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.  For many decades, Justice Cardozo’s 
classic decision in Meinhard has been the most influential case on the duty of 
loyalty and other fiduciary issues, and many New Hampshire cases have refer-
enced Meinhard when discussing fiduciary duties.  E.g., Waite ex rel. Bretton 
Woods Acquisition Co. v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619, 622–23 (N.H. 1989); In re 
Estate of Crowley, 529 A.2d 960, 962 (N.H. 1987); In re Concerned Corporators 
of Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 525 A.2d 671, 685–86 (N.H. 1987); Mussman's Case, 
364 A.2d 1263, 1265 (N.H. 1976). 
 8. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–
21).  No Delaware case specifically states that there are seven subsidiary duties 
implicit in the general duty of loyalty.  Additionally, Delaware cases generally 
refer to these subsidiary duties as “aspects” or “elements” of the general duty of 
loyalty rather than as free-standing duties.  See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Ban-
corporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).  A review of Delaware 
case demonstrates, however, that all seven duties are implicit in the general duty of 
loyalty under Delaware law.  DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 19–31).  Furthermore, it is useful from a practice viewpoint 
to describe these duties as subsidiary duties implicit in this the general duty rather 
than as aspects of the general duty.  Id. 
 9. Id. (manuscript at 2). 
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include rules governing the prosecution of members’ claims that 
managers have breached their fiduciary duties, remedies for these 
breaches, and manager defenses against claims of fiduciary breach.10 
C.  The Importance of Fiduciary Provisions in New Hampshire LLC 
Agreements 
The negotiation of comprehensive fiduciary rules in connection 
with an LLC formation can be a key element of the formation, since 
these rules may provide members with powerful means to encourage 
sound LLC management, to deter manager misconduct, and to rem-
edy this misconduct if it occurs.  To the extent they achieve these 
goals, fiduciary rules can be of great economic value to an LLC.11 
In addition, the fiduciary rules in an LLC agreement can contrib-
ute significantly to the establishment of a relationship of mutual re-
spect, cooperation, and trust among the LLC’s members and manag-
ers.  This relationship may help create a personally satisfying LLC 
work and investment environment.  Indirectly, this purely human 
benefit of fiduciary rules can also substantially enhance the LLC’s 
economic situation. 
Finally, the process of planning with one’s clients how to handle 
fiduciary issues in an LLC formation and negotiating these issues 
with other parties to the formation can provide a valuable means to 
teach clients and other parties about their fiduciary rights and duties.  
This learning opportunity increases the likelihood of fiduciary com-
pliance in the future. 
  
 10. In this article, the phrases “fiduciary duties,” “fiduciary rules,” and “fiduci-
ary issues” will not only refer to fiduciary duties, rules, and issues relating directly 
to fiduciary duties as such, but also to all closely related duties, rules, and issues, 
including, for example, issues relating to fiduciary causes of action, defenses to 
fiduciary claims, procedures for resolving fiduciary disputes (such as derivative 
actions) and manager indemnifications. 
 11. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3); 
see J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: 
Reflections on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 493, 497 (2009); Rutheford B. Campbell, Bumping Along the Bottom: 
Abandoned Principles and Failed Fiduciary Standards in Uniform Partnership 
and LLC Statutes, 96 KY. L.J. 163, 168 (2007).  But see Myron T. Steele, Freedom 
of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and 
Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 224 (2009). 
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D.  The Relevance of Delaware Fiduciary Common Law to New 
Hampshire LLC Fiduciary Law 
The New Hampshire LLC Act contains numerous fiduciary 
rules.  This article will discuss each rule briefly.  There are no New 
Hampshire cases addressing LLC fiduciary issues.  However, the 
New Hampshire LLC Act is based principally on the Delaware LLC 
Act12 and there is an extensive body of Delaware common law on 
the fiduciary rights and duties of business owners and their manag-
ers, including the fiduciary rights and duties of LLC members and 
managers.  Accordingly, in the absence of New Hampshire authority 
on a particular issue, this article will generally refer to Delaware 
common-law fiduciary rules.13 
Furthermore, since Delaware cases routinely apply Delaware 
corporate and limited partnership fiduciary common-law rules to 
LLCs,14 this article will frequently refer to these cases. 
E.  The Fiduciary Rules in an LLC Agreement as Forming a Com-
plex System of Interactive Parts 
The fiduciary provisions in the New Hampshire LLC Act and in 
LLC agreements form complex, multi-part systems in which each 
provision interacts in important ways with other provisions.  When 
  
 12. There is no recorded legislative history of the New Hampshire LLC Act.  
However, the drafters of the New Hampshire LLC Act followed the recommenda-
tion of Robert Keatinge, a leading LLC expert, and modeled the New Hampshire 
LLC Act after the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act.  Compare DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1999) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
limited liability company agreements.”), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) 
(Supp. 2008) (defining a “Limited liability company agreement”), with N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304-C:78 (2005) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maxi-
mum effect to the principal of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
limited liability company agreements.”), and id. § 304-C:1(VI) (defining a “Lim-
ited liability company agreement”). 
 13. Additionally, New Hampshire courts have looked to Delaware case law for 
support in a variety of business and fiduciary issues.  E.g., Kessler v. Gleich, 938 
A.2d 80, 86 (N.H. 2007) (citing In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. 
C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000)). 
 14. E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999). 
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planning and negotiating fiduciary issues in a New Hampshire LLC 
deal, lawyers must be aware of the dynamic interrelationship of 
these issues and must address each issue accordingly.  For example, 
if the governing LLC agreement provides managers with broad ex-
culpation from personal liability for fiduciary breaches, an ordinary 
prudence standard of care—a relatively high standard of care for 
managers—may do little to ensure careful management or to deter or 
remedy manager negligence. 
F.  The Categorization of Fiduciary and Other Provisions of the New 
Hampshire LLC Act 
Obviously, in order to handle fiduciary issues in a New Hamp-
shire LLC formation, lawyers must be familiar with all of the fiduci-
ary provisions and related provisions in the New Hampshire LLC 
Act.  In addition, however, they must properly categorize each of 
these rules as definitional, mandatory, default, or permissive.15 
The definitional rules of the New Hampshire LLC Act are simply 
statutory definitions of terms used in the Act.  Lawyers must know 
these definitions so that they will use the right terms for the right 
concepts in the relevant LLC agreement and thus avoid potentially 
dangerous terminological ambiguity.16 
The mandatory rules of the New Hampshire LLC Act, by their 
terms or by implication, may not be validly altered in LLC agree-
ments.  Lawyers must know each of these rules so that they can in-
struct the LLC, the LLC’s members, or the LLC’s managers to act 
consistent with these mandatory rules.  Furthermore, lawyers must 
know these rules so they do not inadvertently include provisions in 
  
 15. In Elf Atochem, the court systematically categorized provisions of the Dela-
ware LLC Act at issue in the decision as mandatory, default, or permissive, and it 
construed these provisions on the basis of this categorization.  Id. at 292; see also 
DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, ch. 6 (discussing the 
meaning and practical significance of these categories in Delaware LLC formation 
practice and a category of provisions identified in the chapter as “definitional” 
provisions—i.e., provisions that formally that define terms of art employed in the 
act). 
 16. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at ch. 6. 
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LLC agreements which conflict with mandatory rules and are thus 
legally invalid.17 
The default statutory rules of the New Hampshire LLC Act are 
rules that govern an LLC unless the governing LLC agreement pro-
vides otherwise.18  Lawyers must know the default rules that are re-
levant to New Hampshire LLC formations so that they can seek to 
override the default rules in the governing LLC agreement if these 
rules are contrary to their client’s interests.  Furthermore, lawyers 
must know these rules so that, if a particular default rule favors their 
client, they may be able, by remaining silent about it, to obtain its 
inclusion in the LLC deal by default. 
The permissive rules of the New Hampshire LLC Act expressly 
permit, but do not require, the members to adopt specified arrange-
ments in the governing LLC agreement.19  Lawyers must know all of 
the permissive rules in the New Hampshire LLC Act that are rele-
vant to LLC formations so that they can implement them in the gov-
erning LLC agreement if any of the arrangements covered by these 
rules are useful to their client.  Permissive rules can also be useful as 
a basis for LLC opinion practice. 
Section 18-1101(b) of the Delaware LLC Act provides that “[i]t 
is the policy of [the Delaware LLC Act] to give the maximum effect 
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
limited liability company agreements.”20  On the basis of this provi-
sion, in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari the Delaware Su-
preme Court stated in dicta that it would generally treat even seem-
ingly mandatory provisions of the Delaware LLC Act as mere de-
fault provisions subject to alteration by an LLC’s members in their 
LLC agreement absent an intent in these provisions to protect credi-
tors or other third parties.21  Obviously, Elf Atochem is not disposi-
tive authority in New Hampshire.  However, in resolving New 
Hampshire LLC fiduciary claims, the New Hampshire courts are 
likely find the case persuasive, since, as noted above, the terms of 
section 78(II) of the New Hampshire LLC Act are identical to those 
  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 6-32 to -35. 
 20. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1999). 
 21. 727 A.2d 286, 291–92 (Del. 1999). 
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of Delaware LLC Act § 18-1101(b).22  Thus, this article will some-
times apply the Elf Atochem approach in categorizing arguably man-
datory provisions of the New Hampshire LLC Act as default provi-
sions. 
II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CARE 
A.  The Gross Negligence Standard of Care 
Section 31(IV) of the New Hampshire LLC Act expressly im-
poses on LLC managers both a duty of care and a mandatory mini-
mum standard of care—namely, avoiding gross negligence.23  Addi-
tionally, section 78(III)(b) of the New Hampshire LLC Act provides 
that members may expand or restrict the fiduciary and other duties of 
any manager; however, members are not permitted to restrict the 
gross negligence standard of care provided for in section 31(IV).24 
No New Hampshire LLC case law defines the term “gross negli-
gence,”25 but Delaware case law defines “gross negligence” as con-
duct that is recklessly indifferent to the LLC and its members or that 
is “outside the bounds of reason.”26 
B.  The Duty of Care Under Form 6.2, Sections 17.1 and 17.2 
The gross negligence standard is markedly lenient toward man-
agers and is unlikely to deter manager negligence.  In order to strike 
an appropriate balance between members and managers with respect 
to the duty of care, section 17.1 of Form 6.2 imposes a duty of ordi-
nary prudence on managers similar to the standard of care that sec-
tion 8.30 of the New Hampshire Business Corporation Act imposes 
  
 22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 23. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(IV)–(VI) (2005). 
 24. Id. § 304-C:78(III)(b). 
 25. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has defined gross negligence, for the 
purposes of tort law, as “the absence of slight diligence or the want of even scant 
care.”  Corrigan v. Clark, 36 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1944). 
 26. McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008); Benihana of To-
kyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 192 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also DRAFTING 
DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14). 
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on corporate directors.27  However, because LLC managers generally 
must exercise not only the oversight and decision-making functions 
of corporate directors but also numerous operational responsibilities, 
section 17.2 defines ordinary prudence to include not only decision-
making but also operational capabilities.  The complete text of sec-
tions 17.1 and 17.2 is as follows: 
17.1 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Care; Standard of Care 
The manager shall owe a duty of care to the LLC and to the 
other members.  The standard of care shall be competence 
(as defined in Section 17.2). 
17.2 Competence—Definition 
The manager shall be deemed to perform the manager’s du-
ties under this Agreement competently if the manager per-
forms them with the knowledge, judgment, skill, diligence, in-
itiative and timeliness that an ordinarily competent person in 
a like position would use under similar circumstances.28 
LLC members generally find the provisions of section 17 to be 
adequate with regard to the duty of care and standard of care of 
managers.  However, managers may want to amend the section to 
provide for a gross negligence standard of care.  Indeed, some man-
agers may want the governing LLC agreement to eliminate their duty 
of care altogether.  However, because of the absence of the word 
“eliminate” in section 78(III)(b) of the New Hampshire LLC Act, it 
is likely that any such elimination would be invalid.29 
  
 27. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8.30 (1999) (stating that directors have a 
duty to act in good faith and in a manner that they believe is in the best interest of 
the corporation). 
 28. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 17.1–.2. 
 29. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 
167–68 (Del. 2002).  Managers who want to completely eliminate their fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty can only do so under section 18-1101(c) of the Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act and under similar provisions of the small number 
of other non-New Hampshire LLC acts that so permit.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. 
tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (1999).  Section 18-1101(c) of the Delaware Limited Liability 
Act provides that: 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other per-
son has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company 
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C.  The Business Judgment Rule and the Duty of Care 
The business judgment rule is a common-law rule that creates the 
presumption that managers’ business judgments are correct.30  Plain-
tiffs can successfully challenge this presumption by adequately 
pleading that a manager has done any of three things: (1) acted in 
bad faith; (2) breached his or her duty of loyalty; or (3) acted on the 
basis of inadequate information.31 
The business judgment rule is a presumption that the Court 
will not second-guess decisions made by directors unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the 
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot 
be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their de-
cision by a grossly negligent process . . . .32 
The business judgment rule reflects the courts’ awareness that 
many business judgments involve an unavoidable element of risk 
and their reluctance to second-guess these judgments.33 
  
or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or 
is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the mem-
ber’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted 
or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement; 
provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate 
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. 
 30. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
 31. See id.; Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *20 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008) (applying the business judgment rule in a claim against 
the managers of a Delaware LLC); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. 
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS 
ORIGANIZATIONS 4-163 (3d ed. 2009). 
 32. Kahn, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *20 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 652 n.42 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 
 33. In Delaware, the rule also reflects a general policy of the courts to protect 
managers from negligence claims.  See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813–14.  Delaware 
courts have applied the business judgment rule as a mandatory rule applicable to 
Delaware LLCs.  See, e.g., Kahn, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *20; Minn. 
INVCO of RSA #7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC, 903 A.2d 786, 797 
(Del. Ch. 2006). 
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However, if a plaintiff who alleges manager negligence is able to 
overcome the presumption arising under the business judgment rule, 
then the Delaware courts require that the manager bear the burden of 
proof34 in showing the “entire fairness” of the decision in question.35 
No New Hampshire case law exists regarding the applicability of 
the business judgment rule to LLCs or to other unincorporated busi-
ness entities.  It is hard to predict whether the New Hampshire courts 
will apply the rule to these entities.  However, if faced with the issue, 
New Hampshire courts should apply the rule to New Hampshire 
LLCs only if the management of these LLCs involves significant 
entrepreneurial risk. 
D.  The Business Judgment Rule in Form 6.2, Sections 26.4 and 
26.11(a) 
The three-part test provided for in the business judgment rule is 
reflected in Form 6.2, section 26.4.36  Under section 26.11(a), the 
burden of proof shifts from members to managers if the members are 
able to prove that the managers acted on an uninformed basis, that 
they acted in bad faith, or that they had a conflict of interest with 
regard to the matter in question.37  Sections 26.4 and 26.11(a) pro-
vide as follows: 
26.4 Presumption of Compliance of Manager Actions with 
the Managers’ Duty of Care 
(a) Presumption of Compliance.  If a claimant makes a claim 
that any conduct by a manager has breached the manager’s 
fiduciary duty of care, the manager shall be deemed to have 
complied with this duty with respect to this conduct unless 
the claimant shows on the basis of a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
  
 34. Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 898 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)). 
 35. Boyer v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993). 
 36. FORM 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.4(a). 
 37. Id. § 26.11(a). 
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(1) That before engaging in the conduct, the manager 
failed to obtain reasonably adequate information or to 
adequately consider that information; or 
(2) That in engaging in the conduct, the manager acted in 
bad faith; or 
(3) That with respect to the conduct, the manager had a 
conflict of interest. 
(b) Approval by Disinterested Members.  For purposes of this 
Section 26.4, a manager shall be deemed not to have had a 
conflict of interest if the conduct in question was approved in 
advance by majority vote of disinterested members. 
. . . . 
26.11  Shifting of Burden of Proof in Certain Cases Involv-
ing Claims of Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
(a) Claims of Breach of the Duty of Care.  If, in connection 
with a claim that the manager has breached the manager’s 
fiduciary duty of care, a claimant adequately pleads that the 
manager has engaged in any conduct described in Sections 
26.4(a)(1) through (3), the burden of proof shall shift from 
the claimant to the manager and the manager shall bear the 
burden of proving that the manager complied with the man-
ager’s duty of care in the matter in question.38 
Members who wish to deter manager negligence may want to 
provide in their LLC agreements that the business judgment rule 
shall not apply to member claims against the managers.  Managers 
will normally support the inclusion of the rule in LLC agreements 
and will oppose the burden shifting provided for under section 
26.11(a) of Form 6.2. 
  
 38. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 26.4, 26.11. 
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III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY 
A.  Introduction 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by LLC managers is the duty, 
in all matters relating to the LLC, to subordinate their self-interest to 
the best interest of the LLC—that is, to avoid conflicts of interest 
with the LLC.39 
As noted in Part I of this article, Delaware common law can be 
read to imply that the duty of loyalty involves seven specific sub-
sidiary duties.  These subsidiary duties are: 
1. A duty not to compete against the LLC; 
2. A duty to follow “arms’ length” procedures in engaging in 
business with the LLC; 
3. A duty not to usurp LLC business opportunities; 
4. A duty not to derive improper personal benefits from their 
status and activities as managers (as, for example, by unau-
thorized personal use of LLC property); 
5. A duty to make disclosures to the members; 
6. A duty of confidentiality; and 
7. A duty of good faith.40 
The fiduciary duty of good faith is best understood by reference 
to fiduciary bad faith.  Fiduciary bad-faith conduct means, in es-
sence, intentionally or knowingly inflicting or permitting the inflic-
tion of harm on the LLC.41 
  
 39. See In re Regional Diagnostics, LLC, 372 B.R. 3, 28 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2007); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181–
82 (Del. 1986); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 31, at 4-117. 
 40. E.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) 
(duty not to usurp business opportunities); HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 
749 A.2d 94, 113–14 (Del. Ch. 1999) (duty to make disclosures); see also 
DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–32).  
While outside the jurisdictions of Delaware and New Hampshire, Jones Co., Inc. 
v. Frank Burke, Jr., 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954) provides an instructive example 
of the duty not to compete. 
 41. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–66 (Del. 2006). 
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The New Hampshire LLC Act does not expressly impose either a 
general duty of loyalty or any of the above subsidiary duties on man-
agers.  However, section 9(I) of the New Hampshire LLC Act pro-
vides that an LLC may indemnify managers for damages they incur 
in their capacity as managers if, when engaging in the conduct re-
sulting in these damages, they reasonably believed that this conduct 
was not opposed to the best interest of the LLC.42  Section 9(I) im-
plicitly imposes a general duty of loyalty on New Hampshire LLC 
managers.43  In addition, by barring indemnification for bad faith 
conduct, section 9(I) of the New Hampshire LLC Act implies that 
managers have a fiduciary duty to act in good faith.44 
Further, by barring indemnification for improper personal bene-
fits, section 9(II) implies that managers have a fiduciary duty of loy-
alty to avoid these benefits.45  Section 31(V)(b)(2), a default rule 
requiring managers to hold as trustees improper personal benefits, 
also impliedly prohibits these benefits.46 
Moreover, section 31(V)(b)(3), a default rule requiring managers 
to hold in trust benefits from contracts with the LLC, should be read 
to imply that LLC managers have a duty of loyalty with respect to 
business transactions with the LLC.47 
Finally, while there is no New Hampshire case law on the matter, 
on the basis of Delaware precedents and other authority, the New 
Hampshire courts would likely rule that the other subsidiary duties 
of loyalty identified above also apply to New Hampshire LLC man-
agers.48 
  
 42. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:9(I) (2005). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. § 304-C:9(II). 
 46. Id. § 304-C:31(V)(b)(2). 
 47. See id. § 304-C:31(V)(b)(3). 
 48. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  An instructive decision of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire concerning the duty of loy-
alty of corporate directors is Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 761 
(D.N.H. 1997). 
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B.  Can the Duty of Loyalty Be Eliminated Under New Hampshire 
LLC Act Section 31(VI)? 
Section 31(VI) of the New Hampshire LLC Act provides as fol-
lows: 
Subject to the liability of a member or manager for acts of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct provided for in RSA 
304-C:31, IV, a limited liability company agreement may 
eliminate or limit the personal liability of a member or man-
ager for monetary damages for breach of any duty provided 
for in paragraph V.49 
Section 31(VI) arguably provides that the members of a New 
Hampshire LLC may eliminate the fiduciary duty of loyalty and its 
seven subsidiary duties in an LLC agreement.  However, the matter 
is by no means clear, since section 78(III)(b) provides that the mem-
bers may expand or restrict manager fiduciary duties, except for the 
duties to avoid gross negligence and willful misconduct.50  It may be 
reasonably argued that the absence of the word “eliminate” in sec-
tion 78(III)(b) means that the members may not eliminate the duty of 
loyalty or any subsidiary duty.51  The best reading of section 
78(III)(b) is that the general duty of loyalty and all of its seven sub-
sidiary duties may be restricted in LLC agreements except in mani-
festly unreasonable ways but may not be entirely eliminated.52 
C.  Form 6.2, Sections 18 Through 20 
The general duty of loyalty and its seven subsidiary duties are 
imposed on managers under Form 6.2, sections 18 through 20.  Sec-
tions 18 through 20 are titled as follows: 
18.1 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty—General Rule 
  
 49. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(VI). 
 50. Id. § 304-C:78(III)(b). 
 51. See id. 
 52. The concept of “manifest unreasonableness” as a ground for invalidating 
alterations of statutory fiduciary duties in general partnership agreements is em-
ployed in the Revised Uniform Partnership (“RUPA”).  REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 
103(b)(3) & cmt. (1997). 
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18.2 Manager’s Duty Not to Compete against the LLC, Etc. 
18.3 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty with Respect to LLC Busi-
ness Opportunities 
18.4 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty in Doing Business with the 
LLC 
18.5 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Improper Personal 
Benefits 
18.6 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty in Using LLC Property, Etc. 
18.7 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith 
19.1 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Confidentiality 
19.2 Binding Effect of This Section; Termination of Binding 
Effect 
20.1 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure in Connection 
with the LLC’s Formation 
20.2 Manager’s Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure in Connection 
with the LLC’s Operation and Dissolution, Etc. 
20.3 Disclosures Concerning Manager Relationships and In-
terests 
20.4 Nondisclosure Agreements 
20.5 No Requirement to Breach Privacy 
20.6 Manager’s Duty to Update Disclosures after Signing 
This Agreement 
LLC members should sometimes seek to make the provisions of 
the above sections more stringent by, for example, making the pro-
hibitions contained in the provisions absolute rather than subject to 
member vote.  Managers sometimes seek to make them less stringent 
by, for example, carving out specific exceptions to one or more of 
the above seven subsidiary duties of the general duty of loyalty.  
New Hampshire courts will likely respect these exceptions if they 
are not manifestly unreasonable.53  However, as noted above, it is 
  
 53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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unlikely that New Hampshire courts will permit the complete 
elimination of the general duty of loyalty or of any of its seven 
subsidiary duties.54 
IV. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF MANAGERS TOWARD MINORITY 
MEMBERS AND OTHER SPECIFIC CLASSES AND GROUPS OF MEMBERS 
The New Hampshire LLC Act does not address the issue whether 
managers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority members and 
no New Hampshire LLC case law exists on this issue.  By contrast, 
Delaware case law makes clear that, in general, LLC managers have 
fiduciary duties equally toward each LLC member, and not just to 
majority members.55  However, the Delaware case law also provides 
that managers may lawfully discriminate against particular members 
if this discrimination is necessary in order to protect the LLC enter-
prise.56  Under New Hampshire LLC Act section 78(II)(b), the free-
dom-of-contract provision, an LLC agreement may provide that 
managers have fiduciary duties toward one or more specified classes 
of members but not to other specified classes.57 
The fact that managers owe fiduciary duties equally to all of the 
members is implicit in the various fiduciary provisions of Form 6.2.  
However, minority members may want to amend these provisions to 
make this obligation explicit.58 
  
 54. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 31, at 4-153. 
 56. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
181–82 (Del. 1986); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 31, at 4-154. 
 57. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:78(II) (2005). 
 58. New Hampshire law is also silent on the fiduciary duty of the majority mem-
bers of LLCs to the minority.  However, while no such fiduciary duty exists, the 
majority members have a duty to the minority members under the implied contrac-
tual covenant of good faith and fair dealing as in effect under New Hampshire 
contract law.  See, e.g., Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 190–91 
(N.H. 1989).  New Hampshire case law does address the fiduciary duties of major-
ity corporate shareholders toward minority shareholders.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. 
Titcomb, 553 A.2d 1322, 1323–24 (N.H. 1989). 
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V. THE IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING  
A.  Introduction 
The common law in New Hampshire and other states, including 
Delaware, implies, on the part of parties to contracts, a promise (a 
“covenant”) to act in good faith toward all other contract parties and 
to deal fairly with them.59  This implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing (the Implied Covenant) is grounded in 
state public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts60—a policy 
also set forth in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution. 
In general, the Implied Covenant requires that on all issues not 
expressly addressed in a contract, each contract party must act con-
sistently with the reasonable expectations of the other contract par-
ties.61  On these issues, contract parties must avoid, among other 
things: 
1. Engaging in misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit with re-
spect to contract matters; 
2. Abusing discretion accorded to the party under the con-
tract in question; 
3. Failing to perform duties clearly implicit in the contract; 
4. Taking actions that interfere with or prevent the other par-
ty’s performance under the contract; 
5. Taking unfair advantage of the other party in respect of 
the contract; 
  
 59. See, e.g., Lola Cars Int’l Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, C.A. Nos. 4479-VCN, 
4886-VCN, 2009 WL 4052681, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009); Centronics, 562 
A.2d at 190–91; Griswold v. Heat Inc., 229 A.2d 183, 187 (N.H. 1967); DRAFTING 
DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 40–43). 
 60. See Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 
(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (explaining that “the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing protects the spirit of what was actually bargained and negotiated for in 
the contract”); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manu-
script at 41). 
 61. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 41). 
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6. Engaging in conduct that conflicts with customary and 
expected practice in the business, trade, or profession rele-
vant to the contract; and 
7. More generally, acting in a manner that is notably irra-
tional.62 
The New Hampshire LLC Act makes no reference to the Implied 
Covenant.  However, Delaware LLC Act sections 18-1101(b) and (c) 
provide, in effect, that LLC agreements may not eliminate the Im-
plied Covenant as a duty of managers and that they may not elimi-
nate the personal liability of managers for breaching the duty.63  It is 
likely that under the New Hampshire LLC Act, as under the Dela-
ware LLC Act, a court would construe state public policy to preclude 
both the elimination of the Implied Covenant and the elimination of 
the liability of managers for breaching it. 
However, New Hampshire lawyers and their LLC formation cli-
ents should be aware that the protections afforded to LLC members 
against manager misconduct under the Implied Covenant are likely 
to be less effective in preventing manager misconduct than fiduciary 
protections.  Among other considerations, the courts of New Hamp-
shire are likely to be reluctant to apply the Implied Covenant, since 
this will require the court to guess the intent of the relevant contract 
parties and may raise the risk that they will err in doing so.64 
B.  The Implied Covenant Under Form 6.2, Section 21 
Form 6.2, section 21 requires managers to comply with the Im-
plied Covenant.  In addition, for the benefit of members and manag-
ers not familiar with the Implied Covenant, section 21 provides that 
  
 62. Id. (manuscript at 42).  See generally Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, 
Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469, 1474–85 
(2005). 
 63. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(b)–(c) (1999). 
 64. A number of leading cases explain the New Hampshire common law con-
cerning the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the 
meaning of the terms good faith and fair dealing for purposes of this doctrine.  See, 
e.g., Hathorn v. Loftus, 726 A.2d 1278, 1281 (N.H. 1999); Centronics, 562 A.2d 
at 190–91; Griswold, 229 A.2d at 187–88. 
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managers will be deemed to have breached this covenant if they en-
gage in conduct that defeats the members’ reasonable expectations 
without reasonable justification.  Section 21 provides as follows: 
Section 21  Manager’s Duty to Comply with the Implied 
Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(a) The manager shall comply with the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in accordance with 
the contract law of the State of [New Hampshire]. 
(b) The manager shall be deemed to have breached the im-
plied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing if, 
without reasonable justification, the manager engages in 
conduct that defeats the reasonable expectations of the mem-
bers under this Agreement with respect to issues not ad-
dressed in the Agreement.65 
Since the Implied Covenant is grounded in state public policy, it 
presumably cannot be validly altered or eliminated in an LLC 
agreement under the New Hampshire LLC Act.66  Thus, there would 
appear to be little opportunity for either members or managers to 
negotiate amendments to the terms of Section 21. 
C.  The Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith and 
the Contractual Duty of Good Faith Under the Implied Covenant 
The fiduciary duty of good faith requires, in general, that LLC 
managers avoid intentionally or knowingly inflicting or permitting 
the infliction of harm on their LLC.67  The duty of good faith under 
the Implied Covenant requires managers not only to avoid fiduciary 
bad faith, but also to avoid any other conduct that will defeat the 
reasonable expectations of the members under the LLC agreement 
  
 65. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 21. 
 66. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. May 7, 2008); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manu-
script at 41). 
 67. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–66 (Del. 2006). 
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on issues not directly addressed in the agreement.68  This includes 
conduct, whether or not conscious or intentional, that is inconsistent 
with normal commercial practice in the relevant profession, busi-
ness, or trade. 
VI. THE RIGHT OF LLC MEMBERS TO OBTAIN RECORDS AND 
INFORMATION FOR USE IN INVESTIGATING AND CHALLENGING 
MANAGER FIDUCIARY BREACHES 
A.  Introduction—New Hampshire LLC Act Section 28 
New Hampshire LLC Act section 28 provides that upon written 
demand and for a proper purpose, but subject to reasonable restric-
tions to protect confidentiality, LLC members may obtain from their 
LLC a wide variety of records and information, including informa-
tion about the “status and financial condition of the [LLC],” infor-
mation in the LLC’s tax returns, and “other information regarding 
the affairs of the limited liability company as is just and reason-
able.”69  Members may bring actions in the Superior Court to enforce 
section 28.70 
No New Hampshire case addresses on section 28 of the New 
Hampshire LLC Act, including the issue of what constitutes a 
“proper purpose” for obtaining LLC records and information.  How-
ever, the best, and often the only, source of authority for obtaining 
records and information relevant to possible manager misconduct is 
the LLC agreement itself.  Furthermore, Delaware case law makes 
clear that under section 18-305 of the Delaware LLC Act, the provi-
sion that corresponds to New Hampshire LLC Act section 28, the 
investigation of possible manager misconduct constitutes a proper 
purpose for seeking LLC records and information.71  Delaware case 
  
 68. Lola Cars Int’l Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, C.A. Nos. 4479-VCN, 4886-
VCN, 2009 WL 4052681, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009); DRAFTING DELAWARE 
LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 41). 
 69. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(I) (2005). 
 70. Id. § 304-C:28(VII). 
 71. Somerville S Trust v. USV Partners, LLC, No. Civ.A. 19446-NC, 2002 WL 
1832830, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2002); DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 45).  
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law also makes clear that, under section 18-305 of the Delaware 
LLC Act, such records and information, once the members have ob-
tained them, may be used in bringing claims against these managers 
for breaches of fiduciary and other manager duties.72  It is probable 
that the New Hampshire courts would rule similarly under section 28 
of the New Hampshire LLC Act, since the relevant terms of section 
28 are similar to the corresponding terms of Delaware LLC Act sec-
tion 18-305. 
B.  Form 6.2, Section 14; Member and Manager Amendments 
The section of Form 6.2 that addresses the rights of LLC mem-
bers to access and use LLC records and information is section 14. 
Section 14 Members’ Rights to LLC Records and Informa-
tion 
14.1 Access to LLC Records, Etc. 
For any purpose reasonably related to a member’s interests 
as a member (but only for such a purpose), each member 
shall (subject to the restrictions set forth in Section 14.2) 
have the following rights with respect to books and records 
in the possession or control of the LLC (“LLC records”) and 
with respect to information relating to or in the possession or 
control of the LLC (“LLC information”): 
(a) Access to LLC Records.  At any reasonable time dur-
ing normal LLC business hours, upon a written request 
reasonably identifying specific LLC records and stating 
the purpose for which each such record is sought, each 
member shall be entitled to inspect and review each such 
record that is reasonably related to that purpose. 
(b) Obtaining of LLC Information.  At any reasonable 
time during normal LLC business hours, upon a written 
request reasonably identifying specific LLC information 
and stating the purpose for which this information is 
  
 72. See generally NAMA Holdings, LLC v. World Mkt. Ctr. Venture, LLC, 948 
A.2d 411 (Del. Ch. 2007); Somerville S Trust, 2002 WL 1832830. 
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sought, each member shall be entitled to obtain this in-
formation from the manager to the extent that the infor-
mation is reasonably related to that purpose. 
(c) Copying of LLC Records, Etc.  At any reasonable time 
during normal LLC business hours, each member shall 
be entitled to copy at the member’s expense any LLC re-
cord that the LLC is required to disclose to the member 
under this Section 14.1. 
(d) Use of LLC Records and LLC Information.  Each 
member may use LLC records and LLC information dis-
closed to the member under this Section 14 only for the 
purpose stated to the LLC as required under the above 
Sections 14.1(a) and (b). 
14.2 Restrictions 
The rights of the members to access, obtain, copy and use 
LLC records and information under Section 14.1 shall be 
subject: 
(a) To the duty of confidentiality imposed by Section 19 
of this Agreement; 
(b) To any applicable federal or state laws and regula-
tions, including laws and regulations concerning the pri-
vacy of employee medical information; and 
(c) To restrictions reasonably imposed by the manager.73 
Most LLC members are likely to be content with the provisions 
of section 14 as a basis for investigating and challenging manager 
misconduct.  However, managers may often want to amend the sec-
tion by, for example, expanding the procedural barriers that mem-
bers must surmount in order to obtain LLC records and information 
or by increasing their managerial discretion in providing such re-
cords and information to members. 
  
 73. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 14.1, 14.2. 
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VII. FIDUCIARY DISPUTES—LITIGATION VS. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
A.  Alternative Dispute Resolution vs. Litigation—General Consid-
erations 
The New Hampshire LLC Act is silent as to the method that 
LLCs must employ in order to resolve non-derivative internal dis-
putes, including non-derivative claims by members that managers 
have breached their fiduciary or other duties.  Thus, the New Hamp-
shire LLC Act implies that these disputes must be resolved by litiga-
tion in an appropriate court.74 
However, New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 170 requires, 
with certain narrow exceptions, that cases filed in the Superior Court 
be assigned to alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) before being 
litigated.75  Sections 27 and 28.1 of Form 6.2 reflect the policy un-
derlying Rule 170.76  Form 6.2, section 27 provides that if there is a 
dispute among the members or managers of an LLC, the parties must 
seek to resolve it in mediation if they cannot voluntarily resolve it 
among themselves.77  Form 6.2, section 28.1 provides that if media-
tion fails, the parties must resolve the dispute in binding and exclu-
sive arbitration, and it provides that they may not litigate any aspect 
of the dispute except in the narrowly defined circumstances set forth 
in section 28.5.78 
  
 74. New Hampshire LLC derivative disputes are normally resolved through ac-
tions under sections 76(I) through 76(III) of the New Hampshire LLC Act.  N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:76(I)–(III); see infra Part VIII.  Unless the parties agree 
between themselves on alternative dispute resolution, the only forum available 
under New Hampshire law for third-party resolution of direct (i.e., non-derivative) 
claims by members against managers is the New Hampshire Superior Court.  Dur-
ham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 44 (N.H. 2005).  Additionally, it is clear that the 
New Hampshire Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear and resolve these claims.  
Id. 
 75. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170(a)(1). 
 76. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 27–28. 
 77. Id. § 27.1. 
 78. Id. §§ 28.1, 28.5. 
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B.  Factors Potentially Favoring Arbitration over Litigation as the 
Method of Resolving Member Claims Against Managers 
Even apart from Rule 170, there are eleven principal factors that 
persons forming New Hampshire LLCs should normally consider in 
determining whether arbitration is a better option than litigation for 
their LLC in resolving fiduciary claims against managers.  Most of 
these factors generally support reliance on binding, exclusive arbitra-
tion rather than litigation: 
1. Arbitration privacy.  Litigation is public and may involve 
the disclosure of sensitive information regarding one or more 
litigants.  By contrast, the rules governing arbitration in a 
New Hampshire LLC agreement may provide for the confi-
dentiality of some or all of the information disclosed in arbi-
tration proceedings.79 
2. Speed of resolution.  The rules set forth in an LLC agree-
ment may provide for arbitration timetables that will result in 
greater expedition than is likely to be possible in any court. 
3. Resolution of issues not addressed in LLC agreements.  
Except in rare circumstances, New Hampshire courts will re-
frain from addressing issues arising in member claims 
against managers if these issues are not specifically ad-
dressed in the LLC agreement.80  By contrast, arbitration 
provisions in LLC agreements may confer on an arbitrator 
  
 79. Mediation, arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) are purely contractual; thus, the parties to ADR arrangements have great 
freedom in defining their terms.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION RULES, R-1 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=22440 (“The parties [to an arbitration under these rules], by written 
agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these rules.”).  See generally 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS 
USERS (Thomas Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001); PETER R. 
SILVERMAN, THE CLIENT’S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION: THE 
STRATEGY FOR WINNING (2008). 
 80. See Carriage Hill Health Care, Inc. v. Hayden, No. CIV. 96-101-SD, 1997 
WL 833131, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Apr. 30, 1997) (explaining the narrow scope of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of an employment 
contract); White v. Ransmeier & Spellman, 950 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.N.H. 1996). 
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virtually unlimited authority to address these issues and to 
fashion new LLC agreement provisions to resolve them. 
4. Costs.  The arbitration of member claims against manag-
ers will normally be less expensive than litigation of these 
claims in court as long as the arbitration panel consists of a 
single arbitrator.  However, if, as LLC agreements occasion-
ally provide, the panel consists of three arbitrators, arbitration 
may well be substantially more expensive than litigation.81 
5. Evidentiary and procedural rules.  Unless an LLC agree-
ment provides otherwise, arbitrators deciding member claims 
against managers are likely to be more liberal in admitting 
evidence than New Hampshire courts.82  It is true that the 
evidentiary and procedural rules in the litigation of member 
claims against managers are likely to be clearer, more formal, 
and, thus, arguably fairer than arbitration rules.  However, an 
LLC agreement may provide that arbitrations under the 
agreement shall be governed by the evidentiary, procedural, 
or other rules of the courts of the State of New Hampshire or 
of other specified courts. 
6. Industry-specific issues.  New Hampshire judges are 
likely to have a significantly greater knowledge of New 
Hampshire LLC law than many arbitrators.  However, under 
the arbitration provisions of an LLC agreement, members 
making claims against managers may be able to select an ar-
bitrator who possesses substantially greater knowledge of 
specific industrial and commercial laws and practices rele-
  
 81. Arbitrators are generally practicing or retired lawyers or retired judges who 
charge fees for their arbitration services at the hourly rates for legal services 
charged by lawyers with professional backgrounds and credentials generally simi-
lar to those of these arbitrators in the relevant geographical area.  These rates vary 
widely but, in larger cities, may amount to several hundred dollars an hour.  See, 
e.g., American Arbitration Association, Dispute Resolution Services, 
http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). 
 82. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 79, at R-31 (giving arbitrators 
virtually unlimited authority over the admissibility, relevance and materiality of 
evidence and over numerous key discovery issues). 
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vant to the resolution of these claims than any judge is likely 
to possess. 
7. Awarding of litigation costs to prevailing parties.  It is 
normally difficult for a prevailing party in the litigation of 
member claims against managers in New Hampshire courts 
to obtain an award of litigation costs.83  Under the terms of 
the arbitration provisions in an LLC agreement, these awards 
may be readily available to prevailing parties. 
8. “Compromise decisions.”  Although it is sometimes as-
serted that arbitrators tend to render compromise decisions 
that are unfair to one or more parties, studies conducted by 
the Searle Civil Justice Institute of the Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law raise serious doubts about this assertion.84 
9. Site convenience.  Litigation in the New Hampshire courts 
may involve substantial inconvenience and travel expenses 
for one or more parties if these parties are located outside 
New Hampshire.  By contrast, arbitration provisions in LLC 
agreements can usually provide for arbitration sites reasona-
bly convenient to all parties. 
10. Injunctive relief.  The New Hampshire Superior Court 
has inherent authority to grant injunctive relief.85  It is true 
  
 83. See, e.g., Clipper Affiliates, Inc. v. Checovich, 638 A.2d 791, 795–96 (N.H. 
1994) (discussing general rule that each party to a lawsuit is responsible for pay-
ment of his or her own attorney’s fees). 
 84. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 109–13 (2009), available at 
http://www.searlearbitration.org/p/full_report.pdf; WILLIAM K. SLATE, II, STUDY 
SHOWS THAT AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION WORKS (2009), http:// 
web.me.com/naimark/Naimark_Commentary/Commentary_Home/Entries/2009/3/
23_Study_shows_that_aaa_Consumer_arbitration_works.html. 
 85. Under New Hampshire law: 
The superior court shall have the powers of a court of equity in the fol-
lowing cases: charitable uses; trusts other than those trusts described in 
RSA 564-A:1, over which the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction as 
provided in RSA 547:3, I(c) and (d); fraud, accident and mistake; the af-
fairs of partners, joint tenants or owners and tenants in common; the re-
demption and foreclosure of mortgages; contribution; waste and nuisance; 
the specific performance of contracts; discovery; cases in which there is 
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that the arbitration provisions of an LLC agreement may pro-
vide arbitrators of member claims against managers with the 
authority to grant injunctive relief.  However, a party to an 
arbitration may refuse to accept this relief, if ordered by an 
arbitrator, on the ground, whether valid or not, that it is un-
available in the specific circumstances of the claim, and the 
party seeking the relief will be able to enforce the injunction 
only by recourse to the courts. 
11. Jury trials.  In claims by members against managers, par-
ties may believe that their chances for victory will be greater 
if a jury decides the claim.  Juries are normally provided for 
only in courts of general jurisdiction, not in arbitration.  
However, the arbitration provisions in an LLC agreement 
may provide for the resolution of member claims against 
managers by a body of decision-makers possessing many es-
sential qualities of jury members.  These provisions may also 
provide that the rules governing jury selection and other jury 
matters shall be those of a specified court. 
C.  Dispute Resolution Under Form 6.2, Sections 28 and 29 
Sections 27 and 28 of Form 6.2 provide that disputes among the 
parties to the LLC agreement shall be subject to mandatory media-
tion and that disputes not resolved by mediation shall be resolved in 
arbitration.86  The key arbitration rules in section 29 may be summa-
rized as follows: 
1. Single arbitrator.  Each arbitration shall be resolved by a 
single arbitrator.87 
  
not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law; and in all other cases 
cognizable in a court of equity, except that the court of probate shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction over equitable matters arising under its subject mat-
ter jurisdiction authority in RSA 547, RSA 547-C and RSA 552:7.  
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498:1 (2005 & Supp. 2009).  Further, “[t]he court may 
hear and determine such cases according to the course of equity, and may grant 
writs of injunction whenever the same are necessary to prevent fraud or injustice.”  
Id. § 498:2. 
 86. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 28–29. 
 87. Id. § 28.3(b). 
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2 Administration of arbitration by American Arbitration As-
sociation (AAA) if parties cannot agree on arbitrator or site 
of arbitration.88  If the parties cannot agree on the identity of 
the arbitrator or the site of the arbitration, the AAA shall ad-
minister the arbitration under appropriate AAA rules.89  Form 
6.2 specifies the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules.90  
However, AAA also has specialized rules for disputes in-
volving construction, finance, accounting, insurance, intellec-
tual property, real estate, securities, wills and trusts, and 
wireless industry matters.91 
3. Issues subject to arbitration.  Any type of dispute arising 
under or relating to the LLC agreement or relating to the 
LLC’s business or internal affairs shall be subject to arbitra-
tion.92 
4. Permissibility of litigation.  The parties may litigate the 
types of disputes listed above only under specified (and 
sharply restricted) conditions.93 
5. Remedies.  Arbitrators may award any type of legal or eq-
uitable remedy.94 
6. “Loser pays.”  To the extent that a party prevails in arbi-
tration, the arbitrator shall award arbitration expenses to the 
prevailing party.95 
D.  Alternatives to Form 6.2, Sections 28 and 29 
Members may want to negotiate the amendments of sections 28 
and 29 differently depending upon how they value the eleven factors 
that persons forming New Hampshire LLCs should normally con-
  
 88. Id.  
 89. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 79. 
 90. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 28.3(b). 
 91. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Services, 
http://www.adr.org/commercial_arbitration (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
 92. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 28.4. 
 93. Id. § 28.5. 
 94. Id. § 28.13. 
 95. Id. § 28.9(c). 
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sider in determining whether arbitration is a better option than litiga-
tion in resolving fiduciary claims against managers.  It is difficult to 
generalize about the effect of these factors on particular members or 
managers.  However, as shown in the illustrations below, it is nor-
mally fairly easy for members and managers to decide on the basis 
of these factors which amendments, if any, they should seek in the 
above sections. 
Illustration One.  Two individuals, Mr. Manager and Mr. Inves-
tor, are negotiating the formation of XYZ, LLC, a two-member, 
manager-managed, New Hampshire LLC.  Mr. Manager resides in 
St. Louis, Missouri.  Mr. Investor resides in Manchester, New 
Hampshire.  Both Mr. Manager and Mr. Investor will be members of 
XYZ, but, as their names imply, Mr. Manager will be a manager-
member and Mr. Investor will be a non-manager-member.  Mr. In-
vestor is wealthy and can afford litigation costs far more readily than 
Mr. Manager.  Thus, Mr. Investor negotiates to provide in XYZ’s 
LLC agreement that all disputes under or relating to XYZ’s LLC 
agreement or relating to the business or internal affairs of XYZ shall 
be resolved exclusively in litigation and that this litigation shall be 
conducted in the New Hampshire Superior Court. 
Illustration Two.  Same facts as above, except that because of his 
proven management expertise, Mr. Manager has substantial leverage 
in negotiating XYZ’s LLC agreement.  Using this leverage, Mr. 
Manager negotiates to provide in this agreement that all of the above 
types of disputes shall be resolved exclusively in arbitration in St. 
Louis. 
Illustration Three.  Same facts as above, but Mr. Manager and 
Mr. Investor have equal negotiation leverage in the XYZ deal, and 
both of them believe that most of the issues likely to become sub-
jects of dispute between them with respect to XYZ should be re-
solved by a decision maker intimately familiar with commercial 
practices in the highly specialized industry in which XYZ will par-
ticipate.  Accordingly, Mr. Manager and Mr. Investor state in their 
LLC agreement that disputes between them relating to XYZ shall be 
decided by an arbitrator with specialized knowledge of this industry 
in a location convenient to both parties. 
File: Cunningham Final.doc Created on:  3/19/10 2:49 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 2:49 PM 
208 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 2   
VIII. FIDUCIARY CLAIMS AND THE DERIVATIVE ACTION RULES 
A.  The Derivative Action Provisions of New Hampshire LLC Act 
Section 76 
New Hampshire LLC Act sections 76(I) through 76(III) provide 
detailed rules governing a special type of New Hampshire Superior 
Court proceeding called a “derivative action.”96  In such an action, 
one or more members may make claims, in the LLC’s name and on 
its behalf, that managers have breached their fiduciary or other du-
ties.97  If the members prove their case, they may obtain money 
damages from the managers and reimbursement of their reasonable 
expenses, including lawyers’ fees.98 
Under Delaware law, owners of business entities are barred from 
making direct claims in the courts regarding management miscon-
duct—i.e., claims in the members’ rights as individual members—if 
the alleged misconduct primarily affects the entity itself rather than 
any specific owner and thus “belongs” to the entity.99  Rather, under 
Delaware law, the members must bring such a claim as a derivative 
action on behalf of the LLC, and the complexity, cost, and long du-
ration that frequently attend derivative actions may powerfully di-
minish the likelihood that their claim will succeed.100 
However, under Elf Atochem, although the provisions for deriva-
tive actions in sections 18-1001 through 18-1004 of the Delaware 
LLC Act may appear to be mandatory,101 they are merely default, 
since they are not intended to protect third parties.102  A New Hamp-
shire court would be likely to take the same view of sections 76(I) 
  
 96. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:76 (2005). 
 97. Id. § 304-C:78(II). 
 98. Id. § 304-C:78(III). 
 99. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 56); 
see, e.g., Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036–39 
(Del. 2004) (discussing the difference between direct and derivative actions). 
100. See, e.g., Kurt M. Heyman & Patricia L. Enerio, The Disappearing Distinc-
tion Between Derivative and Direct Actions, 4 DEL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2001); Lar-
ry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 743 (2009). 
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1001 to -1004 (1999). 
102. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293–94 (Del. 1999). 
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through (III) of the New Hampshire LLC Act—namely, that they are 
default provisions that may be altered in an LLC agreement.103 
B.  The Treatment of Derivative Actions in Form 6.2, Sections 
26.1(a) and 26.1(d); Member and Manager Amendments 
The provisions of Form 6.2 that are primarily relevant to deriva-
tive actions are sections 26.1(a) and 26.1(d). 
26.1 Who May Make a Claim; Waivers 
(a) Claims by Members.  By giving the other members a writ-
ten notice of mediation under Section 27 or of arbitration 
under Section 28 and by otherwise complying with the dis-
pute resolution provisions of this Agreement, any member (a 
“claimant”) may make a claim as a direct claim in the clai-
mant’s own right against one or more other members or 
against the LLC with respect to any matter arising under or 
relating to this Agreement or relating to the business or in-
ternal affairs of the LLC. 
. . . 
  
103. The New Hampshire Supreme Court likely will be flexible in applying the 
derivative provisions of the New Hampshire LLC Act.  See Kessler v. Gleich, 938 
A.2d 80, 86 (N.H. 2007).  In Kessler, the New Hampshire Supreme Court quoted a 
Delaware limited partnership case as follows: 
As the Court of Chancery of Delaware recognized in an unreported deci-
sion: “In the partnership context, the relationships among the parties may 
be so simple and the circumstances so clear-cut that the distinction be-
tween direct and derivative claims becomes irrelevant,” and that in such 
situations, “superimposing derivative pleading requirements upon claims 
needlessly delays ultimate substantive resolution and serves no useful or 
meaningful public policy purpose.” 
Id. (quoting In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, No. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, 
at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000)).  Accordingly, “[a]pplication of corporate law rules 
to disputes related to a limited partnership necessitates a bit of flexibility.”  Anglo 
Am. Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int’l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143, 150 (Del. Ch. 
2003).  The New Hampshire Federal District Court appears to have a critical view 
of the arguably hollow formalism of traditional corporate derivative rules as ap-
plied to non-corporate entities.  See, e.g., Beane v. Beane, No. 06-CV-446, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33530, at *17 n.11 (D.N.H. Apr. 18, 2008). 
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(d) Derivative Actions.  Unless an arbitrator decides other-
wise, no claimant making a claim under this Agreement shall 
be required to comply with any rule specifically governing 
derivative actions.104 
The provisions of section 26.1 make it relatively simple for 
members to make claims of manager misconduct.  Thus, there are no 
amendments of the section that members forming New Hampshire 
LLCs are likely to need in order to facilitate these claims. 
In order to reduce the risk that members will make claims of 
management misconduct, managers may want to amend Form 6.2, 
section 26.1 to provide that in order to make a claim of manager 
misconduct as a direct claim, members must first prove (or at least 
credibly allege) that the claim does not “belong” to the LLC.  They 
may also want to amend the section to provide that if the claim be-
longs to the LLC, it must be made in accordance with derivative 
rules.  Finally, they may want to amend the section to provide that if 
members make a claim either as a derivative or as a direct claim but 
fail to prove that they have correctly characterized the claim, they 
may not file a new claim even if it is correctly characterized.105 
IX. BURDENS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS OF PROOF IN MEMBER 
CLAIMS OF MANAGEMENT MISCONDUCT 
The New Hampshire LLC Act is silent about two procedural is-
sues that are likely to be critical in any proceeding in which mem-
bers claim that managers have breached their fiduciary or other du-
ties.  These are: (1) which parties shall bear the burden of proving 
these claims, and (2) what standard of proof the parties must meet. 
The implicit rules under the New Hampshire LLC Act concern-
ing these issues are the normal rules in civil actions in the courts of 
New Hampshire.  Thus, under the New Hampshire LLC Act, the 
members must bear the burden of proving their claims against man-
  
104. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.1. 
105. Indeed, the very risk that a court or arbitrator may disagree with the mem-
bers’ conclusion as to whether an action against managers for fiduciary breaches is 
direct or derivative may by itself significantly deter members from bringing such 
an action. 
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agers and they must make this proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.106 
The implicit default standard of proof under the Delaware LLC 
Act for member claims of manager misconduct is the same as that 
under the New Hampshire LLC Act.  However, presumably to deter 
manager disloyalty, Delaware generally places on managers the bur-
den of proving that they have complied with their duty of loyalty if 
their LLCs or their members adequately plead claims of manager 
disloyalty.107  Additionally, Delaware case law provides that the 
managers must bear the burden of proving that they have not 
breached their duty of care if members adequately plead that the 
managers have failed any part of the three-part test under the busi-
ness judgment rule.108 
Consistent with the implicit default rule of the New Hampshire 
LLC Act, Form 6.2, section 26.10(b) provides that the burden of 
proof in any claim under the LLC agreement of a New Hampshire 
LLC shall be proof by a preponderance of the evidence.109  How-
ever, consistent with the Delaware case law, Form 6.2, section 
26.11(a) provides that in well-pleaded member claims of manager 
breaches of the duty of care, managers must bear the burden of 
proof.110  Additionally, section 26.11(b) provides that in defending 
against claims of breach of the duty of loyalty, managers must meet 
the burden of proof unless they are able to adequately plead the de-
fense of member ratification.111 
  
106. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Daigle, 444 A.2d 519, 520 (N.H. 1982) (“In a civil ac-
tion the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff to establish its case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (E. Cleary ed., 
2d ed. 1972).  Some jurisdictions specify that the existence of a nuisance must be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisance § 233 
(2002); cf. Arnold v. Williams, 430 A.2d 155, 156 (N.H. 1981) (standard of proof 
for prescriptive right is “balance of probabilities,” not “clear and convincing”). 
107. See BALLOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 31, at 4-123 (describing burden-
shifting in claims of breach of loyalty under the Delaware common-law doctrine 
known as the “entire fairness” doctrine). 
108. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); 
DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 17). 
109. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.10(b). 
110. Id. 26.11(b). 
111. Id. 
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It is unlikely that members will seek any amendment of the 
above sections of Form 6.2, since these sections provide them with 
substantial protection from manager misconduct.  By contrast, the 
managers may want to amend section 26.11 to require that, in seek-
ing to prove any claim of manager misconduct, the members shall 
have the burden of proof. 
X. MANAGER DEFENSES AGAINST MEMBER CLAIMS OF  
FIDUCIARY BREACH 
A.  Statutory Defenses Under New Hampshire LLC Act Sections 35 
and 78(III)(b) and Common-Law Equitable Defenses 
In litigation or arbitration in which the members of a New 
Hampshire LLC claim that the managers have breached their fiduci-
ary or other duties, the managers obviously may defend themselves 
simply on the basis of the relevant facts.  However, the New Hamp-
shire LLC Act also provides them with specific statutory defenses to 
these claims under sections 35 and 78(III)(a).112 
Section 35 of the New Hampshire LLC Act provides that manag-
ers shall be “fully protected” in relying in good faith on the records 
of the LLC and on “information, opinions, reports or statements pre-
sented to the limited liability company by” its other managers and 
other specified types of persons as to matters the managers reasona-
bly believe are within the competence of these persons.113  While the 
section does not expressly state from what types of claims it is in-
tended to protect managers, its terms indicate that it should be read 
to protect them from damages for any type of claim by the members, 
including contractual claims, claims of breach of the Implied Cove-
nant, and claims of breach of the duties of care and of loyalty. 
Section 78(III)(a) of the New Hampshire LLC Act provides that 
managers “shall not be liable” to the LLC or its members for the 
manager’s “good faith reliance” on the provisions of the governing 
LLC agreement.114  Technically, section 78(III)(a) provides the rele-
  
112. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:35, 78(III)(a) (2005). 
113. See id. § 304-C:35. 
114. Id. § 304-C:78(III)(a). 
File: Cunningham Final.doc Created on: 3/19/10 2:49 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 2:49 PM 
2010 HANDLING FIDUCIARY ISSUES IN LLC FORMATIONS 213 
vant managers with exculpation from damages rather than with a 
defense.115  However, the section functions in practice as a defense 
to the same extent as section 35, and, like section 35, it presumably 
protects managers from every type of claim. 
Finally, managers can undoubtedly rely on all of the various 
types of equitable defenses available to them under New Hampshire 
law.116  These equitable defenses include, for example, equitable 
estoppel, waiver, acquiescence, ratification, laches, and “unclean 
hands.” 
B.  Statutory and Common-Law Defenses Available to Managers 
Under Form 6.2, Sections 26.3 and 28.13(a) 
The manager defenses set forth in New Hampshire LLC Act sec-
tions 38 and 78(III)(b) are reflected in section 26.3 of Form 6.2.  
However, while sections 38 and 78(III)(b) apply if a manager has 
relied in “good faith” on LLC records, etc., section 26.3 of Form 6.2 
permits this reliance only under the more stringent standard of rea-
sonableness.117  Form 6.2, section 26.3 provides as follows: 
26.3 No Breach of Duty of Care or Loyalty If the Manager 
Relies on LLC Records, Etc. 
The manager shall not be deemed to have breached the man-
ager’s duty of care or loyalty under this Agreement if, with 
respect to the matter in question, the manager has acted in 
reasonable reliance on: 
(a) LLC records; 
(b) Information, opinions, reports or statements presented 
to the manager or to the LLC by another member or by 
any other person as to matters that, when presented, the 
  
115. Id. 
116. No single source defines and explains these various defenses as available 
under New Hampshire law.  However, an excellent discussion of them under 
Delaware law may be found in DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF 
CHANCERY ch. 11 (2009).  The discussion of them in WOLFE & PITTENGER under 
the law of Delaware applies equally under New Hampshire law. 
117. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.3. 
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manager reasonably believed to be within the other per-
son’s professional or expert competence; or 
(c) Any provision of this Agreement.118 
Form 6.2, section 28.13(a) supplements the defenses available to 
managers under Form 6.2, section 26.3 with common-law legal and 
equitable defenses.  Section 28.13(a) provides as follows: 
28.13 Permissible Defenses and Remedies 
In any arbitration under this Section 28, the arbitrator shall 
have discretion to determine: 
(a) The extent to which a party may rely upon any spe-
cific common law legal or equitable defense . . . .119 
In practice, members are generally unlikely to seek amendments 
of sections 26.3 or 28.13 with respect to the manager defenses they 
provide.  Managers may want to amend section 26 to, among other 
things, provide for “good faith” reliance rather than “reasonable” 
reliance and, to the extent possible, to limit the types of remedies 
available to members. 
XI. MANAGER REMOVALS 
A.  Manager Removals Under New Hampshire LLC Act Sections 
31(I), 34, and 27(IV) 
Whatever other remedies the members of an LLC may want with 
respect to fiduciary and other breaches by a manager, the first rem-
edy they will want will normally be the manager’s removal.  Three 
provisions of the New Hampshire LLC Act address manager remov-
als—sections 31(I), 34, and 27(IV). 
The third sentence of section 31(I) provides that “[a] manager 
shall cease to be a manager as provided in a limited liability com-
pany agreement.”120  It is unclear whether this sentence should be 
construed as permissive or as mandatory.  If it is construed as per-
  
118. Id. 
119. Id. § 28.13(a). 
120. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(I) (2005). 
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missive, then it simply means that in their LLC agreement, the 
members of an LLC may provide for manager removals.  If it is con-
strued as mandatory, then it means that if the members do not pro-
vide rules in their LLC agreement concerning the removal of manag-
ers, these managers may not be removed and will remain in office as 
managers until they die or resign.  It is unlikely that a New Hamp-
shire court would adopt this latter construction, since it would effec-
tively eliminate an arguably fundamental right of LLC members—
namely, the right to remove managers who breach their fiduciary 
duties.  However, the third sentence of section 31(I) is ambiguous.121  
Thus, the prudent response to the section is to provide in LLC 
agreements express and comprehensive rules governing manager 
removals. 
Section 34 of the New Hampshire LLC Act provides that an LLC 
agreement may provide “specified penalties or specified conse-
quences” for manager misconduct.122  Section 34 implicitly but 
clearly authorizes, among other “penalties” or “consequences” for 
breaches by managers of their fiduciary or other duties, their re-
moval as managers.123 
By its terms, section 27(IV) of the New Hampshire LLC Act 
provides for the removal of members, not managers.124  Thus, the 
section likely must be read to apply only to removals of managers 
who are also members and not to the removal of non-member man-
agers.125  In essence, the section provides for two different proce-
dures under which members other than the manager-member in 
question may remove a manager-member.  First, it provides that 
other members may remove the manager-member by a vote of two-
thirds of the other members “acting reasonably and in good faith.”126  
Second, it provides that any two other members—or in the case of an 
LLC with only two members, one of the members—may petition a 
court to remove the manager-member.127 
  
121. Id. 
122. Id. § 304-C:34(I). 
123. Id. § 304-C:34(II).  
124. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:27(IV) (Supp. 2009). 
125. See id. 
126. Id. § 304-C:27(IV)(a). 
127. Id. § 304-C:27(IV)(b). 
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However, applying the dicta of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Elf Atochem, all of the various provisions of section 27(IV) can 
safely be construed as default.128  Thus, for example, it seems clear 
that no provision of the section would prevent the members of a New 
Hampshire LLC from providing in their LLC agreement that a man-
ager-member may be removed for causes other than “inability or 
unwillingness to exercise management responsibilities, actions be-
yond authority or contrary to the limited liability company agree-
ment, or fraudulent or illegal actions in relation to the business and 
affairs of the company.”129 
B.  Manager Removals Under Form 6.2, Section 15.5; Member and 
Manager Amendments 
Form 6.2, section 15.5 provides that a manager-member may be 
removed by majority vote of the other members “at any time with or 
without cause” upon the majority vote of the other members.130  In 
practice, the members of multi-member LLCs typically do not seek 
to amend section 15.5, since it provides them with broad discretion 
in removing managers.  However, many managers may want to seek 
amendments of the section.  These amendments may include, for 
example, provisions for manager removal only if the managers 
commit serious breaches of the LLC agreement and fail to cure these 
breaches (if curable) within a reasonable time after receipt of notice. 
XII. OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS FOR MANAGER 
BREACHES OF THEIR FIDUCIARY AND OTHER DUTIES 
A.  Remedies Available Under New Hampshire LLC Act Section 34 
to Members Making Claims Against Managers 
Even in planning for the negotiation of New Hampshire LLC 
deals, prospective members and their lawyers should consider the 
remedies they may want for breaches by managers of their fiduciary 
  
128. See Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 295 (Del. 1999). 
129. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:27(IV). 
130. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 15.5. 
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duties.  These may normally include: (1) the statutory remedies un-
der New Hampshire LLC Act section 34; and (2) various common-
law and equitable remedies. 
Section 34 of the New Hampshire LLC Act is a permissive pro-
vision that provides members with virtually unlimited flexibility as 
to the types of remedies they may obtain against managers for 
breaches of fiduciary and other duties, including “penalties” (which 
might otherwise be unavailable to them because of the general rule 
of contract law prohibiting penalties).131 
B.  Common-Law Legal and Equitable Remedies Potentially Useful 
to Members Making Claims Against Managers 
In addition to the classic common-law legal remedies of com-
pensatory and punitive damages, there are ten main types of equita-
ble remedies potentially useful to members claiming manager 
breaches of their fiduciary or other duties.  These are: 
1.  Prohibitory and mandatory injunctions; 
2.  Specific performance; 
3.  Rescission and rescissionary damages; 
4.  Reformation; 
5.  Accounting; 
6.  Constructive and resulting trusts and the related remedy 
of equitable liens; 
7.  Subrogation; 
8.  Quia timet;  
9.  Equitable restitution; and 
10. Declaratory relief.132 
  
131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 304-C:34 (2005). 
132. A useful resource under Delaware law with respect to the above equitable 
remedies is WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 116, ch. 11.  The discussion in 
WOLFE & PITTENGER generally applies equally under New Hampshire law. 
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As with legal and equitable defenses, a detailed discussion of the 
above legal and equitable remedies is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.  However, if lawyers are representing members who are consid-
ering or who have brought such claims, they should normally advise 
these members not only about the statutory and common-law legal 
remedies potentially useful to them, but also about all potentially 
useful common-law equitable remedies. 
C.  Remedies Available to Members Under Form 6.2, Section 
28.13(b) 
For the reasons outlined in Part VII of this article, practitioners 
should generally recommend to clients forming New Hampshire 
LLCs that their LLC agreements provide for mediation and arbitra-
tion rather than litigation as the methods for resolving member 
claims against managers and other LLC internal disputes.  Mediation 
and arbitration can be particularly appropriate for New Hampshire 
LLCs with relatively few members and relatively limited capital. 
Thus, Form 6.2, sections 27 and 28 provide for the resolution of 
LLC internal disputes by mandatory mediation followed, if neces-
sary, by mandatory arbitration.133  As discussed in Part VII of this 
article, the hallmark of these and other alternative dispute resolution 
methods is procedural flexibility.  This flexibility is reflected in 
Form 6.2, section 28.13(b).  Section 28 is entitled “Dispute Resolu-
tion—Mandatory Arbitration.”  Section 28.13(b) provides as fol-
lows: 
28.13 Permissible Defenses and Remedies 
In any arbitration under this Section 28, the arbitrator shall 
have discretion to determine: 
. . . .  
(b) Whether to award any specific legal or equitable rem-
edy.134 
  
133. Form 6.2, supra note 3, §§ 27, 28. 
134. Id. § 28.13(b). 
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In view of the virtually unlimited range of remedies available to 
members under section 28.13(b), there are no amendments of that 
section which members are likely to want.  However, managers may 
want to eliminate from the coverage of section 28.13(b) one or more 
of the various types of statutory and common-law remedies poten-
tially available to members under that section. 
XIII. EXCULPATION OF MANAGERS FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR 
FIDUCIARY AND OTHER BREACHES 
A.  Exculpation of Managers Under the New Hampshire LLC Act 
Section 31(V)(a) of the New Hampshire LLC Act, the default 
rule, generally provides that unless the LLC agreement provides oth-
erwise, a manager shall not be liable “for any action taken or failure 
to act on behalf of the [LLC].”135  However, under section 31(VI), 
the members of an LLC in their LLC agreement may not exculpate 
managers from personal liability for a breach of the duty of care for 
gross negligence.136  Additionally, under section 31(VI), the mem-
bers of an LLC in their LLC agreement may not exculpate managers 
from personal liability for willful misconduct.137  Though there ap-
pears to be no New Hampshire authority on the matter, on its face 
willful misconduct appears to refer to conduct that Delaware com-
mon law refers to as bad faith conduct, i.e., intentionally or con-
sciously disregarding fiduciary responsibilities.138 
Further, under section 9(I), the members of an LLC may not ex-
culpate managers for bad faith conduct or disloyal conduct.139  It is 
  
135. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(V)(a) (2005). 
136. Id. § 304-C:31(VI); see also id. § 304-C:31(IV). 
137. Id. § 304-C:31(VI). 
138. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“[B]ad 
faith will be found if ‘a fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known 
duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’” (quoting In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006))); Robotti & Co. 
v. Liddell, C.A. No. 3128-VCN, 2010 WL 157474, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2010) 
(explaining that bad faith, in the context of a breach of the duty of loyalty, arises 
“when a fiduciary consciously disregards his or her responsibilities”). 
139. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:9(I). 
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true that Section 9(I) addresses indemnification, not exculpation.  
However, while the matter is not without doubt, it is likely that the 
members may not lawfully exculpate managers for amounts for 
which they cannot lawfully indemnify them.  Finally, under sections 
31(V)(b)(2) and (3), the members of an LLC may restrict the liability 
of managers for breaches of their duty of loyalty but may not elimi-
nate this liability.140 
B.  Exculpation of Managers Under Form 6.2, Section 26.5; Mem-
ber and Manager Amendments 
Section 26.5 of Form 6.2 addresses manager exculpation.141  
This section provides no general exculpation for LLC managers.  
Rather, it requires that the manager request exculpation in each case 
and that the exculpation be approved by majority vote of the disin-
terested members.142  Additionally, the section prohibits exculpation 
of personal liability for breaches of the Implied Covenant.143 
In practice, the members of New Hampshire LLCs may some-
times want to amend section 26.5 of Form 6.2 to prohibit exculpa-
tion altogether or to provide for stricter procedural requirements for 
exculpation, while managers may often want to amend the section to 
mandate exculpation of damages for specified types of conduct. 
XIV. LLC INDEMNIFICATION OF MANAGERS 
A.  Indemnification Under Section 9 of the New Hampshire LLC Act 
New Hampshire LLC Act section 9 sets forth provisions con-
cerning LLC indemnification of managers for expenses, including 
attorneys’ fees, judgments, and settlements, which they have in-
curred in defending themselves from claims arising from their con-
duct as managers.144  Under section 9, an LLC agreement may not 
indemnify a manager for expenses relating to derivative actions in 
  
140. Id. § 304-C:31 (V)(b)(2)–(3). 
141. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.5. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:9(I). 
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which the manager was judged liable to the LLC.145  Additionally,  
the LLC Agreement may not indemnify a manager for expenses in-
curred by the manager in a direct action in which the manager was 
judged liable for having derived an improper personal benefit.146  
Finally, subject to the above prohibitions, section 9(I) provides that 
LLC agreements may indemnify managers for any expenses incurred 
by them if, in the matter in question the managers: (1) conducted 
themselves in good faith; and (2) reasonably believed that their con-
duct was “not opposed to the best interest of the [LLC].”147 
B.  Manager Indemnification Under Form 6.2, Section 26.7; Mem-
ber and Manager Amendments 
Like New Hampshire LLC Act section 9, Form 6.2, section 26.7 
permits LLCs to indemnify members, managers, and other per-
sons.148  However, the section limits the scope of section 9 of the 
New Hampshire LLC Act so that the liabilities that the LLC may 
indemnify under section 26.7 are limited to those relating to the 
business and internal affairs of the LLC.149  In addition, under sec-
tion 26.7, the managers may receive indemnification from the LLC 
only if they request it in each case and only if a majority of disinter-
ested members approve it.150 
The text of Form 6.2, section 26.7 provides as follows: 
26.7 Indemnification of Members, the Manager and Others 
(a) Indemnification.  If a member, manager or other person 
incurs a liability in respect of a claim relating to the business 
or internal affairs of the LLC, then, if (i) the person requests 
indemnification of the liability in writing in each case; and 
(ii) the disinterested members approve it by majority vote, the 
LLC may indemnify the person for the liability to the extent 
  
145. Id. § 304-C:9(II)(a). 
146. Id. § 304-C:9(II)(b). 
147. Id. § 304-C:9(I). 
148. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.7. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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permitted by the LLC Act and approved by the disinterested 
members 
(b) Liability—Definition.  For purposes of Section 26.7(a), a 
liability means an obligation to pay a judgment, settlement, 
penalty, fine or reasonable expense (including reasonable at-
torneys’ fees) in respect of a claim described in Section 
26.1(a).151 
In practice, members may want to amend section 26.6 to bar in-
demnifications or to impose more stringent conditions for indemnifi-
cation.  Managers may want to amend the section to provide for 
more extensive indemnification.  However, it is possible that a New 
Hampshire court would rule that any such amendment is invalid on 
public policy grounds to the extent that it effectively condones seri-
ous management misconduct. 
XV. ADVANCEMENT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION EXPENSES  
BY LLCS TO MANAGERS  
A.  Advancement Under the New Hampshire LLC Act—General 
Considerations 
The New Hampshire LLC Act is silent on whether LLCs may 
advance to members, managers, or other persons ADR or litigation 
expenses likely to be incurred by them in defending themselves 
against fiduciary and other claims.  However, the Act contains no 
prohibition against advancement; for some LLCs, the prospect of 
advancement may be a significant factor in attracting competent 
managers, and the policy of freedom and enforceability of contract 
set forth in New Hampshire LLC Act section 78(II) unquestionably 
authorizes advancement provisions in LLC agreements.152 
Furthermore, although there are no New Hampshire cases con-
cerning LLC advancement, Delaware courts routinely enforce ad-
  
151. Id. 
152. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 304-C:78(II). 
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vancement provisions in LLC agreements in accordance with their 
terms.153 
However, the Delaware cases also make clear that: in the ab-
sence of specific advancement provisions in an LLC agreement, 
managers and other parties to the agreement have no right to ad-
vancement; the inclusion of indemnification provisions in an LLC 
agreement by no means implies a right to advancement; and the 
terms of advancement provisions will be strictly construed.154 
B.  Advancement Under Form 6.2, Section 26.8; Member and Man-
ager Amendments 
Form 6.2, section 26.8 provides for advancement to current and 
former members and managers of “reasonable mediation, arbitration 
and litigation expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees” to cov-
er the defense of claims against these members and managers 
relating to their conduct as members or managers.155  However, the 
section makes advancement conditional on a number of factors: 
these members and managers must request the advancement in writ-
ing in each case; they must agree to reimburse the LLC for the ad-
vancement to the extent that they do not prevail in the claim in ques-
tion; and a majority of disinterested members must approve each 
advancement and the terms of the reimbursement agreement.156 
Because of financial and other concerns, the members of some 
LLCs may want to amend section 26.8 to prohibit advancement alto-
  
153. See, e.g., Majkowski v. Am. Imaging Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 913 A.2d 572, 587 
(Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to advancement because 
“hold harmless” language in an agreement does not grant advancement rights); 
DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, No. 1384-N, 2006 WL 224058, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 23, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff was entitled to advancement); Senior Tour 
Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Holding Co., 853 A.2d 124, 125 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to advancement in accordance with 
the express terms of their agreement); Morgan v. Grace, No. 20430, 2003 WL 
22461916, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs were entitled 
to advancement under one agreement but not another, because the right to ad-
vancement and the right to indemnification are distinct). 
154. DRAFTING DELAWARE LLC AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 71–
73). 
155. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.8. 
156. Id. 
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gether.  Managers are unlikely to succeed in any effort to eliminate 
the reimbursement promise requirement in the section.  However, 
they may in some cases be able to obtain an amendment providing 
for guaranteed advancement. 
XVI. MANAGER LIABILITY INSURANCE 
A.  Introduction 
As noted by Balotti and Finkelstein, director and officer liability 
insurance “has become an important aid to a corporation in attracting 
and retaining corporate managers and directors.”157  For New Hamp-
shire LLCs, provisions in their LLC agreements providing for man-
ager liability insurance, like those providing for exculpations, in-
demnification, and advancement, can be powerful tools in attracting 
and retaining effective management.  Furthermore, although the New 
Hampshire LLC Act is silent as to whether LLCs may purchase this 
kind of insurance and although there are no New Hampshire or 
Delaware LLC cases on the issue, the right of LLCs to make such 
purchases is unquestionable under section 78(II) of the New Hamp-
shire LLC Act.158 
Moreover, for many LLCs, the cost of obtaining manager liabil-
ity insurance can be relatively low.  For example, my personal in-
quiries indicate that relatively small non-public LLCs may be able to 
obtain, for an annual premium as low as two thousand dollars, man-
ager liability insurance with a policy limit of $1 million per claim 
and an annual $1 million aggregate limit. 
B.  Liability Insurance Under Form 6.2, Section 26.9 
For many New Hampshire LLCs, the risk that any of their man-
agers will ever be subject to a suit by a member or a third party for 
their actions as managers is arguably quite small, especially for 
LLCs with relatively few members, few or no passive investors, and 
  
157. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 31, at 4-87. 
158. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 304-C:78(II) (2005) (setting forth the New 
Hampshire LLC Act statutory policy of freedom of contract and LLC agreement 
enforceability). 
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relatively limited assets.  Thus, Form 6.2, section 26.9, the provision 
of that form that addresses manager liability insurance, merely 
authorizes the LLC to acquire this insurance but does not require it 
to do so.159   
26.9 LLC’s Duty to Provide Liability Insurance for Members 
and Managers in Certain Circumstances 
Whether the LLC shall maintain an insurance policy to cover 
liabilities incurred by members as a result of claims against 
them in their capacity as members or managers shall be de-
cided by the majority vote of the members.160 
However, the managers of some LLCs are likely to want their 
LLCs to obtain manager liability insurance as a condition for their 
service as managers.  Further, for many LLCs this insurance may be 
reasonably affordable and thus acceptable to the members as an LLC 
commitment.  In these circumstances, the LLC agreement should 
contain a provision agreeing to provide the insurance. 
However, the terms of director, officer, and manager liability in-
surance policies vary widely and are sometimes highly negotiable.  
Thus, an agreement by the members to obtain this insurance for its 
managers is likely to be only the first step in a potentially complex 
process of identifying and addressing these terms.161 
Managers who want their LLC to obtain manager liability insur-
ance will want the broadest possible insurance coverage, including 
coverage of manager expenses relating to member claims against 
them.  However, for financial or other reasons, members may want 
relatively narrow coverage. 
  
159. Form 6.2, supra note 3, § 26.9. 
160. Id. 
161. See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and 
Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Prac-
tical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573 (1996) (providing a useful introduction to the legal 
and practical issues relevant in evaluating and obtaining director and officer liabil-
ity insurance); DAVID M. GISCHE & VICKI FISHMAN, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
LIABILITY INSURANCE, http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/D&O-InsOvrvu.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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XVII. THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW 
HAMPSHIRE LLC ACT SECTION 31(I) AS IMPLICIT FIDUCIARY 
PROVISIONS 
Thus far, this article has focused primarily on provisions of the 
New Hampshire LLC Act and on New Hampshire and Delaware 
case law dealing more or less expressly with LLC fiduciary issues as 
such.  On their face, the first and second sentences of New Hamp-
shire LLC Act section 31(I) deal only with general issues of LLC 
management structure and not with fiduciary issues.162  However, 
these two sentences, properly understood, are among the more im-
portant fiduciary provisions in the New Hampshire LLC Act. 
The first two sentences of section 31(I) are permissive provi-
sions.  The first sentence provides as follows: “A limited liability 
company agreement may provide for the management, in whole or in 
part, of a limited liability company by a manager or managers, who 
shall be chosen by the members in the manner provided in the lim-
ited liability company agreement.”163  The second sentence of sec-
tion 31(I), which is also presumably a permissive provision, provides 
that the managers of LLCs “shall hold the offices and have the re-
sponsibilities accorded to [them] by the members and set forth in a 
limited liability company agreement.”164 
The above sentences, when read together, must be construed to 
provide an implicit general statutory default rule that, to the extent 
that the members of an LLC do not expressly or impliedly “accord” 
to the managers the right to decide an LLC matter under section 
31(I) in their LLC agreement, the members must be deemed to have 
retained the right to decide that matter by member vote. 
Admittedly, this general rule cannot be extended to the decision 
of matters pertaining to the day-to-day business of the LLC, since by 
the very act of appointing managers, the members must be deemed 
to have granted to managers the right to decide these matters.  How-
ever, the rule clearly does apply, albeit by implication, to all LLC 
matters other than day-to-day business matters. 
  
162. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 304-C:31(I). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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Furthermore, these non-day-to-day matters must be deemed by 
implication to include, among many other types of matters, numer-
ous important fiduciary matters involving the control of manager 
conduct but not expressly addressed in other provisions of the New 
Hampshire LLC Act or in any relevant case law.  This is so because, 
in the absence of express terms to the contrary in an LLC agreement, 
the members cannot reasonably be deemed to have granted this con-
trol to the managers themselves. 
In particular, the above two sentences must be deemed to provide 
the members with an implicit but clear statutory default right to de-
cide by member vote the following critical types of LLC fiduciary 
issues (and possibly numerous other fiduciary issues) not expressly 
addressed under any other New Hampshire LLC Act provision or 
relevant case: 
1. Whether to approve a manager’s competing against the 
LLC; 
2. Whether to approve a manager’s appropriating an LLC 
business opportunity; 
3. Whether to approve a manager’s engaging in a business 
transaction with the LLC and the terms of that engagement; 
4. Whether to approve a manager’s accepting a personal 
benefit obtained by reason of the manager’s status or actions 
as a manager; 
5. Whether to authorize the LLC to bring a claim against the 
manager for breaches of the manager’s fiduciary or other du-
ties; 
6. Whether to remove a manager for breach of fiduciary or 
other duties; 
7. Whether to seek remedies against managers other than 
removal for manager breaches of their fiduciary or other du-
ties (such as money damages); 
8. Whether to require the LLC to obtain liability insurance 
for manager breaches of their fiduciary and other duties; 
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9. Whether to approve the LLC’s advancement of litigation 
expenses to managers charged with fiduciary or other 
breaches; 
10. Whether to approve exculpation of managers who have 
breached their fiduciary or other duties; 
11. Whether to approve LLC indemnification of managers 
who owe damages for breaches of their fiduciary or other du-
ties; 
12. Whether to impose a duty on the managers concerning 
an issue on which Delaware common law and the agreement 
are silent. 
Finally, it is clear that under the default voting rules of section 
24(V), the above matters may by decided by the vote of a mere ma-
jority of the members and do not require a supermajority vote.165 
XVIII. CONCLUSION 
Sound fiduciary provisions can contribute significantly to the 
success of New Hampshire LLCs.  However, in order to competently 
handle fiduciary issues in New Hampshire LLC formations, lawyers 
must have a thorough knowledge of New Hampshire LLC statutory 
and common-law fiduciary rules.  In addition, with respect to New 
Hampshire LLC fiduciary issues on which there is no New Hamp-
shire statutory or common law, they must know the relevant Dela-
ware law, since the New Hampshire LLC Act is based to a substan-
tial degree on the Delaware LLC Act. 
Finally, they must know how to handle the very different inter-
ests that will be relevant if they are negotiating on behalf of prospec-
  
165. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:24(V).  Section 24(V) provides that, unless 
the LLC agreement or the New Hampshire LLC Act provides otherwise, each 
member shall have one vote on each matter on which the members may vote, and 
that each such matter shall be decided by vote of members holding a majority of 
member votes.  Id.  Furthermore, no provision of the New Hampshire LLC Act 
expressly or impliedly provides that fiduciary matters shall be decided by other 
than a majority vote. 
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tive members or prospective managers in a New Hampshire LLC 
formation. 
